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Abstract
We study the rational behaviors of participants in committee-based blockchains. Committee-based
blockchains rely on specific blockchain consensus that must be guaranteed in presence of rational
participants. We consider a simplified blockchain consensus algorithm based on existing or proposed
committee-based blockchains that encapsulate the main actions of the participants: voting for a
block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and achieving the consensus
gives rewards to committee members, we study using game theory how strategic participants behave
while trying to maximize their gains. We consider different reward schemes, and found that in
each setting, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; in some settings
however, there can be coordination failures hindering consensus. Moreover, we study equilibria with
trembling participants, which is a novelty in the context of committee-based blockchains. Trembling
participants are rational that can do unintended actions with a low probability. We found that in
presence of trembling participants, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed;
however, when only voters are rewarded, there also exist equilibria where validity can be violated.
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1 Introduction
Most cryptocurrencies rely on distributed technology ledgers. Each user of the cryptocurrency
may have a local copy of the ledger. The most popular among the distributed ledger
technologies is probably blockchain. A blockchain is a growing sequence of blocks, where
each block contains transactions and is linked to the previous block by containing the hash
of the latter. Modifying information in a block changes its hash, and the subsequent blocks
should be changed in consequence. Blockchains then offer many guarantees, such as tamper
resistance. The number of blocks since the genesis to the current is called the height of
the blockchain, and there should ideally be only one block per height. The way blockchain
systems are built (in particular how to add blocks) can be roughly separated in two classes:
(i) forkable blockchains, where for each height, one participant is drawn at random and has
the charge to produce a new block; or (ii) committee-based blockchains, where for each height,
a committee is selected and is in charge of agreeing on which block to append next.
Forkable blockchains are the most famous and the most popular. There are many
techniques to build such blockchains. The protocol to add a new block in the most popular
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blockchains (Bitcoin [22], Ethereum [25]) is called proof-of-work (PoW), introduced in [13].
In PoW, a participant needs to prove that it worked to have the right to add the next block.
More in details, for a participant to be selected to add a block in the blockchain, it has to be
the first to resolve a crypto-puzzle: the more computing power, the higher the chances are to
win. This gives rise to many problems, first to increase the chance to solve the problem faster,
one needs specialized equipment and a lot of computing power. All participants do these
computations, but there is only one winner. These non-environment-friendly computations
are not useful other than to solve the crypto-puzzle. Another issue with PoW is that
although the probability of having multiple winners at the same time is extremely low, it is
not impossible. From time to time, there are multiple winners and blocks proposed for the
same height; these are called forks, and to ensure consistency and avoid double-spending,
fork management should be implemented. To try solving these issues, some blockchains
propose to replace the PoW with other protocols such as proof-of-stake, e.g., Ouroboros [18].
In proof-of-stake, the more stakes a stakeholder has in the blockchain, the higher are its
chances to add a block to the chain. This solves the problem of energy consumption, but not
the presence of fork; the selection of the leader is somehow still random. Proof-of-stake may
also introduce some concentration of power by the richest stakeholders. Other proof-of-*
proposals have been made, but all suffer from the fork issue, and sometimes many more.
On the other hand, there are committee-based blockchains, e.g., Algorand [16], HotStuff
[26], Tendermint [7], etc. They have the purpose of avoiding forks by relying, instead
of one participant drawn at random for each block, on a committee that has to agree
on the next block to add. The committees run blockchain consensus algorithms. Those
algorithms are inspired by well-known algorithmic techniques such as the one from classical
consensus [8, 12, 19, 21, 24]. Committee-based blockchains can guarantee the absence of
forks. Compared to Bitcoin and proof-fo-work blockchains, committee-based blockchains
seem slower since they require many messages to be exchange, and the selection of the
committee members is a complex problem.
In both cases, forkable or non-forkable, blockchain systems usually have economical
or financial advantages, specifically for block creators. These advantages serve to give an
incentive to maintain the blockchain. With advantages given, participants of such systems
may try to maximize their profit. Those participants do not necessarily want to harm the
system; they often want to stay in the system but gain the most from it. Such participants are
called rational. To avoid blockchains collapsing due to the presence of rational participants,
we must study them, and ensure that the blockchain consensus properties always hold.
Contributions. In this work, we analyze the behavior of rational participants in committee-
based blockchains. We show the different equilibria that exist given different methods of
rewarding the committee members. We analyze if the equilibria do satisfy the consensus
specifications or not. In particular, we found that there always exist equilibria that satisfy
the blockchain consensus properties, but these equilibria are not unique and coordination
failures may occur, leading to liveness issues. Let ν be the number of votes required for a
block to be considered produced. The different equilibria are summarized in Table 1.
Additionally, we introduce the notion of “trembling hand” which to the best of our
knowledge is a novelty in distributed systems. The trembling hand can be viewed as a failure
of rational participants. The idea of trembling hand and acknowledging errors has been
studied in different fields, such as in economics (e.g., [11]), in networks (e.g., [10]), etc. With
low probability, the player can tremble and do an unintended action. We conduct the same
equilibrium analysis and found that there exist equilibria satisfying the consensus properties.
Y. Amoussou-Guenou, B. Biais, M. Potop-Butucaru, and S. Tucci-Piergiovanni 12:3
Table 1 Summary of the Equilbria with Rational Players.
Reward All Reward Only Senders
ν = 1
Proposition 5
In equilibrium, exactly one message is sent:
Consensus
Proposition 1
In equilibrium, All players send a message:




- No message is sent:
No Termination: No block, coordination failure, or




- No message is sent:
No Termination: No block, coordination failure, or
- All players sent a message:
Consensus; but inefficient: too costly
Table 2 Summary of the Equilbria with “Trembling” Players.
Reward All Reward Only Senders
ν = 1
Proposition 13
In the equilibrium, one message sent if valid:
Consensus
Proposition 9
In the equilibrium, either
- n messages always sent: Validity not guaranteed




- No message is sent: No Termination
- ν − 1 messages always sent + 1 if valid: Consensus
Proposition 11
In equilibrium, either:
- No message is sent: No Termination
- (if ν < n) n messages always sent: Validity not guaranteed
- ν − 1 messages always sent + (n− ν + 1) if valid: Consensus
However, there also exist equilibria inducing liveness or safety issues because the consensus
properties cannot be guaranteed. Equilibria with trembling participants are summarized in
Table 2. In all cases, we found that equilibria, when all committee members are rewarded,
are efficient in terms of the number of messages.
Related work. Many analyses have been made on strategic behaviors in blockchains.
However, they mainly focus on forkable systems (e.g., [6, 14]). To the best of our knowledge,
very few works have been dedicated to analyze or discuss the rational behaviors among
participants in committee-based blockchains. Some exceptions have to be noted.
The work of Abraham et al. in [2] is probably the first to consider strategic behaviors in
committee-based blockchains. They introduced interesting incentive mechanisms, but did not
provide a formal framework for their analysis, nor did they consider the cost of the actions.
Recently, Fooladgar et al. show in [15] that the proposed reward distribution in Algorand
does not lead to an equilibrium. Interestingly, as in our paper, [15] considers the cost of
actions of the players; but as opposed to us, among other things, players have basically one
action, either following the protocol or not, so it either incurring all costs or no cost at all.
In our work, we refine the approaches; We consider that multiple actions are available to the
players, and that they just pay the costs of the actions they did, and not all of them.
In [4], we provide a framework for the analysis of strategic behaviors in the presence of
rational players can either exhibit strategic or adversarial behaviors for committee-based
blockchains. We however only considered one reward mechanism and did not study trembling
hand effects. In this work, we extend the model in [4]; we consider systems with participants
that behave strategically and can exhibit trembling hand effects. Additionally, in this work,
we study the behavior of the participants under different reward schemes, as opposed to [4].
Previous works studying rational behavior in consensus algorithms (such as [1, 17, 20])
did not take into consideration the rewards given when a decision is reached, nor the cost of
participants’ actions. They usually proposed incentive-compatible protocols. Blockchains
highlighting the costs and rewards, we take them into account in our analysis.
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2 Model
2.1 System Model
We consider a system composed of a finite and ordered set Π of n players, called committee,
of synchronous sequential players denoted by their index, namely Π = {1, . . . , n}.
Communication. The players communicate by sending and receiving messages through
a synchronous network. We assume that the players proceed in rounds. A round consists
of three sequential phases, in order: the send, the delivery and the compute phase. Since
we consider synchronous communication, there is a known upper bound on the message
transfer delay. Such upper bound is used by the players to set the duration of their rounds,
in particular, the duration of the delivery phase is such that for all players, all messages sent
at the beginning of the round are received before the end of the delivery phase. At the end
of a round, a player exits from the current round and starts the next one. We assume the
existence of a reliable broadcast primitive. A broadcast is reliable if the following conditions
hold: (i) safety: every message delivered by a player has been previously sent by a source,
and (ii) liveness: every player eventually delivers every message sent by a source. Messages
are created with a digital signature, and we assume that digital signatures cannot be forged.
When a player i delivers a message, it knows the player j that created the message.
Players Behavior. We consider that players are rational. Rational players are self-interested
and their objective is to maximize their expected gain. They will deviate from a prescribed
protocol if and only if doing so increases their expected gain. They differ from honest players
who always follow the prescribed protocol.
We also consider trembling players. With low probability, an external function can return
an unexpected value. They do not want such value, but are not in control of that, and are
not aware when the returning value is “normal” or not. They only know the probability of
such an event happening. A trembling player is also a rational player.
2.2 Consensus in Presence of Rational Players
A blockchain is a growing sequence of blocks. The number of blocks since the genesis to
the current is called the height of the blockchain. In committee-based blockchains, for each
height, a committee is selected and is in charge of agreeing on which block to append next.
As proposed by many articles (e.g., [3], [5], [9], [16], [26], . . . ), committee-based blockchains
can be developed using consensus algorithms. In particular, at each height, the protocol used
by the corresponding committee must implement the consensus. In the section, we adapt the
definition of consensus properties to take into account the presence of rational players.
We say that a protocol is a consensus algorithm in presence of rational players if the
following properties hold:
Termination: every rational player decides on a value (a block);
Agreement: if two rational players decide respectively on values B and B′, then B = B′;
Validity: a decided value by any rational player is valid; w.r.t a predefined predicate.
Problem. We study the behavior of rational players in a consensus protocol. The goal is to
know whether consensus is guaranteed in committee-based blockchains in the presence of
rational players. For the study, we use the notion of Nash equilibrium, which is intuitively a
“stable” situation where no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
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The question we answer is: What are the different Nash equilibria and do they satisfy the
consensus properties? It is important to note that we do not propose a protocol such that all
rational behave as honest, but rather study the behavior of rational players in a blockchain
consensus algorithm under different reward mechanisms.
2.3 Protocol Studied
In committee-based blockchains, for each height, there is a committee supposed to reach
a consensus on the block to append. The agreement procedure can be seen as a vote in
potentially multiple sequential rounds. Focusing on one height, the consensus procedure is
as follows. For each round:
A proposer is selected for the current round. The proposer of the round proposes a block
(the proposal) and send it to the rest of the committee members.
Once a player receives the proposal, it should check its validity and vote (by sending a
message) for the block only if it is valid; otherwise, it should not vote if invalid.
At the end of the round, all committee members collect the vote messages and count them.
Let ν be the number of votes required for a block to be considered produced (the decision of
the consensus). If the proposal receives votes for at least ν different committee members,
then the block is consider produced; otherwise the next round starts with a new proposer,
proposing a new block and the procedure restarts until a decision is made. When a player
considers a block produced (i.e., collects ν votes for the block), due to the communication
model we consider, all players will also consider the block as produced since they have the
same set of messages at the end of any round.
As explained above, these two phases encapsulate the main and important ideas of
consensus protocol for committee-based blockchains. Moreover, Chan and Shi in [9], extended
this two phases approach (Propose and Vote) to present multiple algorithms for different
communication and failures models; pointing out the importance and sufficiency of these
phases in consensus algorithms for blockchains.
In the following, we describe the actions rational players have. We present it as a protocol
shown in Algorithm 1. Definition of the game and actions is done in the next section. We
consider the choice of (i) checking or not the validity of a block and (ii) sending or not the
vote for a proposed block. We consider that the actions of checking the validity of the block
and of sending the message (of type vote) are costly.
Protocol of Rational Players. Rational players have some freedom at executing the pre-
scribed protocol. We represent their possible actions in Algorithm 1, where specific variables
have been introduced; namely,
actioncheck ∈ {false, true}, if the player decides to check the validity of the proposal or
not; and
actionsend ∈ {false, true}, if the player decides to vote for the proposal or not (depending
on the validity information the player has about the proposal).
isProposer(t, h) returns the identifier of the proposer for the current round (line 10).
All players sets their actions locally, in more details, player i sets its action variable
actioncheck (resp. actionsend) by calling the dedicated function σchecki (resp. σsendi ) repres-
enting its strategy.
The strategy σchecki determines if i, the receiving player, chooses to check the validity
of the proposal or not, which is a costly action. If the player chooses to check the validity
(line 17), it will also update the knowledge it has about the validity of the proposal and it
will pay a cost ccheck. If otherwise, the player keeps not knowing if the proposal is valid or
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for a given height h modeling the rational player i’s behavior.
1: Initialization:
2: vote := nil
3: t := 0 /* Current round number */
4: decidedV alue := nil
5: actioncheck := nil
6: actionsend := nil
7: validV alue[] := {⊥,⊥, . . . ,⊥} /* validV alue[r] ∈ {⊥, false, true} */
8: Round PROPOSE(t) :
9: Send phase:
10: if i == isProposer(t, h) then
11: proposal← createValidValue(h)
12: broadcast 〈PROPOSE, h, t, proposal〉
13: Delivery phase:
14: delivery 〈PROPOSE, h, t, v〉 from proposer(h, t)
15: Compute phase:
16: actioncheck ← σchecki () /* σ
check
i () ∈ {false, true} sets the action of checking or not the validity of the
proposal */
17: if actioncheck == true then
18: validValue[r]← isValid(v) /* The execution of isValid(v) has a cost ccheck */
19: actionsend ← σsendi (validValue) /* σ
send
i : {⊥, false, true} → {false, true} sets the action of sending the
vote or not */
20: if actionsend == true then
21: vote← v /* The player decides to send the vote, the proposal might be invalid */
22: Round VOTE(t) :
23: Send phase:
24: if vote 6= nil then
25: broadcast 〈VOTEi, h, t, vote〉 /* The execution of the broadcast has a cost csend */
26: Delivery phase:
27: delivery 〈VOTE, h, t, v〉 /* The player collects all the votes for the current height and round */
28: Compute phase:
29: if |〈VOTE, h, t, v〉| ≥ ν ∧ decidedV alue = nil ∧ vote 6= nil ∧ vote = v then
30: decidedV alue = v; exit
31: else
32: vote← nil
33: t← t + 1
not (validValue[t] remains at ⊥). Note that this value remains at ⊥ even if the player is the
proposer. This is because we assumed, without loss of generality, that checking validity has
a cost and that the only way of checking validity is by executing the isValid(v) function.
Note that the strategy σsendi depends on the knowledge the player has about the validity
of the proposal. The strategy determines if the player chooses to send its vote for the proposal
or not (line 19 - 25). If the player chooses to vote for the proposal, it will pay a cost csend.
Let us note that a rational player that did not check the validity of the block could
consider as decision of the committee an invalid value if it collects more than ν votes for an
invalid proposal. We also note that in the model model considered, the Agreement property
always holds, since, at the end of each round, all players have the same set of messages
delivered.
Note that the creation of proposal (line 11 of Algorithm 1) will be subject to the trembling
hand effect in Section 5.
2.4 Game
Action space. At each round t, when a player receives the proposal, it decides whether to
check the block’s validity or not (at cost ccheck), and then given the validity information, it
decides whether to send a vote message (at cost csend) or not.



















Figure 1 Decision Tree of one Player after Reception of the Proposal.
Information sets. At the beginning of each round t > 1, the information set of the player, ηti ,
includes the observation of the round number t, as well as the observation of what happened
in previous rounds, namely (i) whether the player decided to check validity, and in that case,
it knows the validity of the block, (ii) how many messages were sent, and (iii) whether a
block was produced or not.
Then, in each round t > 1, the player decides whether to check the validity of the current
block. At this point, denoting by bt the block proposed at round t, when the player does not
decide to check validity isValid(bt) is the null information set, while if the player decides
to check, isValid(bt) is equal to 1 if the block is valid and 0 otherwise. Therefore, at this
stage, the player information set becomes Hti = ηti ∪ isValid(bt), which is ηti augmented
with the validity information player i has about bt, the proposed block.
Strategies. At each round t ≥ 1, the strategy of player i is a mapping from its information
set into its actions. At the point at which the player can decide to check block validity, its
strategy is given by σchecki (ηti). Finally, after making that decision, the player must decide
whether to vote or not, and that decision is given by σsendi (Hti ). The decision tree of a player
is depicted in Figure 1. We note that when the player does not check the validity of the
proposal, it does not know if the block is valid or not.
We denote by σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) the strategy profile where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, player i use
strategy σi, where σi(Hti ) is the pair (σchecki (ηti), σsendi (Hti )).
Rewards and Costs for the Players. We study the cases in which:
1. when a block is produced, only the committee members which voted are rewarded (and
receive R); or
2. whenever a block is produced, all committee members are rewarded (and receive R).
We will explicitly state the case we are studying.
We also assume that when an invalid block is produced, all players incur a cost κ1. Note
that κ is not incurred when no block is produced. We assume that the reward R, is larger
than the cost ccheck of checking validity, which is larger than the cost csend of sending a vote
message. Lastly, the reward obtained is smaller than the cost κ of producing an invalid block.
That is, κ > R > ccheck > csend > 0.
1 Such a cost corresponds, for example, to the loss of confidence in the blockchain system caused by the
invalid block produced, hence hurting the whole ecosystem.
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Objective of Rational Players. Let T be the round at which the game stops. If a block
is produced at round t ≤ n, then T = t. Otherwise, if no block is produced, T = n+ 1. In
the latter case, the termination property is not satisfied. In our analyses, we focus on what
happens during the first round; in particular, when T ≥ 2, we say that termination is not
satisfied at round 1.
As explained above, we study two types of rewards. The analyses are done independently.
In each setting, all rational players have the same gain function detailed in the following
when we focus only on the first round.
1. Reward Only Sender: When the reward is given only to players that vote for the
















) − κ ∗ 1(invalid block produced at round 1)
]
, (1)
where 1(.) denotes the indicator function, taking the value 1 if its argument is true, and
0 if it is false.
2. Reward All: When the reward is given to the whole committee once a block is produced,
for the first round, the expected gain of rational player i is:
Ui(σ) = E
[









) − κ ∗ 1(invalid block produced at round 1)
]
. (2)
Equilibrium concept. We consider the players are playing Nash equilibria, and we focus
only on their behavior during the first round.
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be a strategy profile, where σi is the strategy of player i. We
write (σ−i, σ′i) to represent the strategy profile (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, . . . , σn) where player i
deviates, and the others continue playing their strategy. A strategy profile is a pure Nash
equilibrium [23] if no player can increase its gain by unilaterally deviating. Formally, σ is a pure
Nash equilibrium if and only if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and ∀σ′i a strategy for i, Ui(σ) ≥ Ui((σ−i, σ′i)).
We simply use Nash equilibrium instead of pure Nash equilibrium.
The following sections present our results.
In Sections 3 & 4, we do not have trembling hand effects, therefore, we cannot have invalid
blocks since the proposal should be valid (line 11 of Algorithm 1). Focusing on liveness issues,
we study whether players vote or not in equilibria.
In Section 5, trembling effects are considered, and the proposal may be invalid. Therefore,
for safety reasons, players may check the proposal’s validity before voting or not.
3 Reward Only Committee Members that Vote
In this section, we consider that only committee members that voted for a produced block
are rewarded. Equation 1 describes the gain of each rational player.
We study the different equilibria with respect to the value of ν, the minimum number of
votes required to consider a block as produced.
First, we analyze the case where 1 vote for a proposed block is sufficient to considered it
as produced, i.e., ν = 1.
I Proposition 1. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν = 1, and
when only players that vote for the produced block are rewarded, there is only one Nash
equilibrium. In the unique equilibrium, all players vote for the proposed block.
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In this equilibrium, all players vote, and the block is produced. No player has an incentive
to deviate and not send, such deviation will mean for the player that it will not be rewarded
while the block is produced.
I Remark 2. Note that in the Nash equilibrium of Proposition 1, the consensus properties
are satisfied, in particular, there is always a block produced at the end of the first round.
We now consider the situation where strictly more than one vote is needed to consider a
block as produced, i.e., ν ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
I Proposition 3. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν > 1, and
when only players that vote for the produced block are rewarded, there are two Nash equilibria;
either (i) all players vote, or (ii) no player votes.
In the first equilibrium, if a rational player anticipates that no players will vote, its only
vote will not make the proposal produced, since ν > 1, therefore, the player prefers not
voting. In the second type of equilibrium, if a player anticipates that all other players are
voting, it prefers voting as well; otherwise, if the player does not send, it will not have a
reward.
I Remark 4. There are two Nash equilibria in Proposition 3. In the equilibrium where no
player votes, Termination is not guarantee at round 1. In the second equilibrium where there
are n votes, the consensus properties are satisfied in the first round.
4 Reward All Committee Members
In this section, we consider that all committee members are rewarded once a block is produced.
Equation 2 describes the gain of each rational player.
We study the different equilibria with respect to the value of ν, the minimum number of
votes required to consider a block as produced.
First, we analyze the case where 1 vote for a proposed block is sufficient to considered it
as produced, i.e., ν = 1.
I Proposition 5. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν = 1, and
when all players are rewarded once a block is produced, in the Nash equilibria, exactly one
player votes, and the others do nothing.
If the player supposed to vote does not vote, no block is produced, and hence it does not
have any reward. Therefore, it prefers voting, since a block is always produced in equilibrium,
if a player not supposed to send deviates and votes, it will pay the cost of sending for nothing
since it will be rewarded even without voting.
I Remark 6. Note that there exists at most n equilibria corresponding to Proposition 5. In
all the equilibria corresponding to Proposition 5, the consensus properties are satisfied.
We now consider the situation where strictly more than one vote is needed to consider a
block as produced, i.e., ν ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
I Proposition 7. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν > 1, and
when all players are rewarded once a block is produced, in the Nash equilibria, either (i)
exactly ν players vote, or (ii) no player votes.
If a rational player anticipates that no players will vote, since ν > 1, its only vote will
not make the proposal produced, therefore, it is better off not voting. In the other type of
equilibrium, exactly ν players vote; if a player supposed to send does not vote, the block is
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not produced and the deviating player is not rewarded any more; if a player not supposed
to send deviates (by voting) it will incur a cost of sending, when it will be rewarded in any
case, so it prefers not to vote.
I Remark 8. There are two types of Nash equilibria in Proposition 7.
The equilibrium where no player votes does not guarantee Termination at round 1.
In the second type of equilibrium in this setting, there are exactly ν messages sent. There





+ 1 equilibria corresponding to that setting2. In each of them, the
consensus properties are satisfied.
A summary of the different equilibria in Sections 3 & 4 can be found in Table 1. When
only 1 vote is required to consider a proposal as produced, in all equilibria, blocks are always
produced. When we require strictly more than 1 vote to consider a block as produced,
although there are equilibria where the consensus is guaranteed, there is also an equilibrium
where no player votes, anticipating that the others will not vote as well: a coordination failure,
leading to a violation of the Termination. This happens in the two reward mechanisms:
reward all committee members, or reward only the members that voted. However, in the
equilibria where all committee members are rewarded, less messages are sent, making it a
more efficient (and less costly) mechanism with respect to the number of messages.
5 Trembling Players at Proposal
Now, we assume that there is some negligible probability p for the createValidValue
function (line 11 of Algorithm 1) to return an invalid proposal, and all players are aware
of the trembling effect. When proposing a value there is a probability that the hand of the
player trembles and proposes an invalid block instead of a valid block; i.e., in some sense, we
take into account the possibility of making a mistake for the proposal.
Note that now, checking the validity of a block may be important, there is a risk of
producing an invalid block, violating the validity property of the consensus. To ensure
that the reward covers the costs of checking and voting, in this setting we assume that
(1 − p)(R − csend) − ccheck > 0. We also note that it is better for the player to vote (resp.
not vote) without checking than checking and voting (resp. not voting) irrespective to the
block validity; that would mean incurring a cost −ccheck for nothing. It is also not in their
best interest to check the validity of the proposal and vote if the proposal is invalid, that
would mean increasing the chances of producing an invalid block and incurring a cost −κ. In
the analyses, we then consider only the three relevant strategies: a rational player can (i)
vote without checking proposal validity, (ii) not vote nor check proposal validity, and (iii)
check the proposal validity and vote only if the proposal is valid.
In the following, we make the same analyses as in Sections 3 & 4, i.e., we analyze the
behavior of rational players when only voters are rewarded; and their behaviors when all
committee members are rewarded.
5.1 Reward Only Committee Members that Vote
In this subsection, we consider that only committee members that voted for a produced






= Cνn is the number of combinations for choosing ν out of n elements.
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We study the different equilibria with respect to the value of ν, the minimum number of
votes required to consider a block as produced.
First, we analyze the case where 1 vote for a proposed block is sufficient to consider it as
produced, i.e., ν = 1.
I Proposition 9. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν = 1, when
only players that vote for the produced block are rewarded, and if there is a probability p that
the proposer proposes an invalid block, there are two Nash equilibria. In equilibrium, either
(i) if κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p, all players check the validity of the proposal and vote only if it
is valid; or (ii) all players vote for the proposal without checking the validity of the proposal.
As in Proposition 1, one can note that in equilibrium, all players do (try to) vote.
I Remark 10. There are two Nash equilibria in Proposition 9. In the equilibrium where
all players check and vote, if the proposal is invalid, there is no Termination at the first
round, however Validity is always ensured. While in the second equilibrium where no player
checks but votes, Termination is always guaranteed at the end of the first round, even if the
proposal is invalid, which violates the Validity.
We now consider the situation where strictly more than one vote is needed to consider a
block as produced, i.e., ν ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
I Proposition 11. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν > 1, when
only players that vote for the produced block are rewarded, and if there is a probability p
that the proposer proposes an invalid block, there are three Nash equilibria. Either (i) no
player votes nor checks the proposal validity; or (ii) if ν < n, all players vote for the proposal
without checking the validity of the proposal; or (iii) if κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p, n− ν + 1
players check the validity of the proposal and vote only if it is valid, and the ν − 1 remaining
players only vote without checking the validity of the proposal.
Proof of Proposition 11. We prove that the strategy profiles described in the proposition
are Nash equilibria.
First, we prove that the strategy profile where no player votes is a Nash equilibrium. The
gain at equilibrium of any player is 0. If one player deviates and votes, there is only 1
vote and the block is not produced since ν > 1, the gain at deviation is −csend < 0. If the
player deviates by checking block validity, it will pay the cost −ccheck − (1− p)csend < 0.
The strategy profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
We now prove that the strategy profile where all players vote without checking the
proposal validity is a Nash equilibrium. Let ν < n, the gain at equilibrium of any player
is R − csend − pκ. Even if one player deviates, the block will be produced in any case
(since ν < n) no matter its validity. If a player deviates by checking validity and voting if
the proposal is valid, its gain will be (1− p)(R− csend)− ccheck− pκ; if the player deviates
and does not check proposal’s validity nor votes, its expected gain at deviation is −pκ,
the gain at deviation is lower than the gain at equilibrium. The strategy profile is indeed
a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to prove that the strategy profile where some players are supposed to check
the proposal validity and check only if the block is valid and the remaining players vote
without checking block validity is also a Nash equilibrium.
We can first note that only valid blocks can be produced following the equilibrium, and
invalid blocks do not have the necessary ν votes, since only ν − 1 players vote without
checking, and so for invalid proposal.
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The expected gain of a player not supposed to check is (1− p)(R− csend). If it deviates
and does not vote, its gain at deviation is 0; if it deviates by checking and voting only
if the proposal is valid, its expected gain at deviation is (1 − p)(R − csend) − ccheck,
which is lower than the gain at equilibrium.
The expected gain of a player supposed to check is (1 − p)(R − csend) − ccheck. If it
deviates and does not vote, its gain at deviation is 0. If it deviates by voting without
checking the proposal’s validity, any block proposed will be produced, no matter
its validity since ν votes are sent in any case, so the expected gain of the deviating
player is R − csend − pκ, which is lower than the gain at equilibrium if and only if
κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p.
The strategy profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, there is no more equilibrium. We sketch the proof by exhibiting the main other
equilibrium candidates.
Let x ≥ 0. Assume by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium where n − ν − x
players check the block validity and vote only if the proposal is valid, and the remaining
ν + x players vote without checking the block validity.
That means any block proposed will be produced, since ν + x ≥ ν players vote without
checking validity. Let i be a player supposed to check. It expected gain is R − csend −
ccheck − pκ, while if i deviates and votes without checking proposal validity, its expected
gain will be R− csend − pκ. Contradiction, the strategy profile is not an equilibrium.
Let x > 1. Assume by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium where n − ν + x
players check the block validity and vote only if the proposal is valid, and the remaining
ν − x players vote without checking the block validity.
Let i be a player supposed to check. It expected gain is (1− p)(R− csend)− ccheck. If i
deviates and votes without checking proposal validity, there will be ν − x+ 1 < ν votes
for invalid an block proposed, and so it will not be produced, where there will be n votes
for a valid block proposed; the expected gain at deviation for i is (1 − p)(R − csend).
Contradiction, the strategy profile proposed is not an equilibrium. J
I Remark 12. There are three types of Nash equilibria in Proposition 11.
The equilibrium where no player votes does not guarantee Termination at round 1.
In the equilibrium where no player checks, Termination is always guaranteed at the end
of the first round, even if the proposal is invalid, which violates the Validity property.
In the last equilibrium, valid blocks are produced and invalid blocks are not. Termination




equilibria corresponding to that setting.
5.2 Reward All Committee Members
In this section, we consider that all committee members are rewarded once a block is produced.
Equation 2 describes the gain of each rational player.
We study the different equilibria with respect to the value of ν, the minimum number of
votes required to consider a block as produced.
First, we analyze the case where 1 vote for a proposed block is sufficient to consider it as
produced, i.e., ν = 1.
I Proposition 13. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν = 1, when
all players are rewarded once a block is produced, if there is a probability p that the proposer
proposes an invalid block, and if κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p, in all Nash equilibria, exactly one
player checks the validity of the proposal and votes only if it is valid, while the other players
do nothing.
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As in Proposition 5, one can note that in equilibrium, the task of validating (checking) and
producing a block is delegated to one player.
I Remark 14. Note that there exists at most n equilibria corresponding to Proposition 13.
In all the equilibria corresponding to Proposition 13, if the proposal is invalid, there is no
Termination at the first round, however, Validity is always ensured.
We now consider the situation where strictly more than one vote is needed to consider a
block as produced, i.e., ν ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
I Proposition 15. In one round, with only rational players in the committee, if ν > 1, when
all players are rewarded once a block is produced, if there is a probability p that the proposer
proposes an invalid block, and if κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p, in all Nash equilibria, either (i) no
player votes, or (ii) 1 player checks the proposal validity and votes only if it is valid, exactly
ν − 1 other players vote without checking validity, and the others do nothing.
Proof of Proposition 15. We prove that the strategy profiles described in the proposition
are Nash equilibria.
First, we prove that the strategy profile where no player votes is a Nash equilibrium. The
gain at equilibrium of any player is 0. If one player deviates and votes, there is only 1
vote, and the block is not produced since ν > 1, the gain at deviation is −csend < 0. If the
player deviates by checking block validity, it will pay the cost of checking for nothing and
will have the gain −ccheck − (1− p)csend < 0. The strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to prove that the strategy profile where some players are supposed to check the
proposal validity, and vote only if the block is valid; some players vote without checking
block validity; and the others do nothing is a Nash equilibrium.
We first note that only valid blocks can be produced following the equilibrium, and invalid
blocks do not have the necessary ν votes, since only ν − 1 players vote without checking.
First, the players that do not vote nor check validity have an expected gain of (1− p)R.
Let i be such a player. If i deviates and votes without checking, any proposal will
be produced, no matter its validity, therefore, the gain of the player at deviation is
R− csend − pκ, which is lower than the gain at equilibrium. If instead, i deviates and
checks the validity of the proposal and votes only if it is valid, only valid blocks will be
produced, so the gain at deviation will be (1− p)(R− csend)− ccheck, which is lower
than the gain at equilibrium.
Now, turns to the players not supposed to check but vote. Their expected gain at
equilibrium is (1− p)R− csend. Let i be such a player, if it deviates and does not vote
nor checks, no block will be produced and its gain at deviation is 0 < (1− p)R− csend.
If it deviates by checking and voting only if the proposal is valid, its expected gain at
deviation is (1 − p)(R − csend) − ccheck, which is lower than the gain at equilibrium
since csend < ccheck.
Finally, we can analyze the one player supposed to check. Without loss of generality,
assume that it is player with index 1. The expected gain of player 1 is (1− p)(R −
csend) − ccheck. If it deviates and does not vote, no block will be produced, so its
gain at deviation is 0 < (1 − p)(R − csend) − ccheck; if it deviates by voting without
checking the proposal’s validity, any block proposed will be produced, no matter its
validity since ν votes are sent in any case; therefore, the expected gain of player 1 at
deviation is R− csend − pκ, which is lower than the gain at equilibrium if and only if
κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p.
The strategy profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium. No deviation is profitable.
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There is no more equilibrium in this setting.
First, let us note that in any case, exactly ν players should vote (counting also those
supposed to vote after checking). If there are less than ν players supposed to vote (but at
least one), no block is produced so one such player can deviate and not vote, economizing its
cost. If there are more than ν players supposed to vote, one can deviate by not voting and
economizing that cost.
We can show that the other main equilibrium candidates are not equilibria.
By contradiction, assume that there exists an equilibrium where ν players vote without
checking the proposal’s validity and the others do not vote nor check.
Let i be a player supposed to vote. It expected gain at equilibrium R− csend − pκ, while
if i deviates by checking the proposal validity and voting only if valid, only valid proposal
will be produced, so its expected gain will be: (1− p)(R− csend)− ccheck which is greater
than the equilibrium. Contradiction, the strategy profile is not an equilibrium.
By contradiction, assume that there exists an equilibrium where ν players vote (counting
also those supposed to vote after checking) and the others do not vote nor check. Suppose
that in the set of players supposed to vote, at least two i and j check the validity of the
proposal and vote only if it is valid. In this strategy profile, only valid proposals will be
produced. The expected gain at equilibrium of i is (1− p)(R− csend)− ccheck. If instead,
i deviates and always votes without checking validity, its expected gain at deviation is
(1−p)R−csend, which is greater than the gain at equilibrium. Contradiction, the strategy
profile is not an equilibrium. J
I Remark 16. There are two types of Nash equilibria in Proposition 15.
Termination is not guaranteed at round 1 in the equilibrium where no player votes.
In the second type of equilibrium in this setting, there are exactly ν votes when the
proposal is valid, but ν − 1 votes when the proposal is invalid. Termination is not






corresponding to that setting.
A summary of the different equilibria with trembling players can be found in Table 2.
When all players are rewarded once a block is produced, there is no “bad” equilibrium, i.e.,
an equilibrium where Validity is violated, while when only players that vote for a produced
block are rewarded when ν < n, there exists a “bad” equilibrium (Propositions 9 and 11).
6 Discussions
Before concluding, we discuss some interesting points that are not directly addressed in the
core of this paper.
Fixed amount of Reward for the Committee. First, we quickly highlight what happens if
there is a fixed reward for the committee members that is shared by them. Let µ be the
number of players that are rewarded in the committee, and let Rµ be the fraction of the
reward each player rewarded gets. Our equilibrium analysis still holds, but attention should
be given to the bounds. For example, in Proposition 9, instead of κ ≥ R− csend + ccheck/p
we should have κ ≥ R/n− csend + ccheck/p, since all players vote in case of a valid proposal.
(here, µ = n).
Honest Players. Recall that honest players always follow the prescribed protocol, i.e., they
always check the validity of the proposal, and vote only if the proposal is valid.
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We did not include honest players in this paper for the following reason: their presence
does not change the different equilibria we have; they may however change the bounds under
which some equilibria exist.
Denote by h the number of honest players in the committee. Generally, if there are
h honest players and ν messages are required for the production of a block, h votes are
guaranteed for valid blocks only; then for the rational players, the goal is to give the ν − h
remaining votes.
7 Conclusion
We analyze the behavior of rational players in committee-based blockchains under assumptions
of synchrony of messages and under different mechanisms of rewards. Although our analysis
focuses on a single round, the behaviors of the rational players can be repeated in multi-round
settings, since each new round has the same setting as the first round, and therefore, be
viewed as independent. This paper study the case where there is one proposer at the time
and does not consider the case of multiple proposers as in Algorand which has multiple
proposers at the same time and rely on probabilistic consensus while we consider only
deterministic consensus. We found that although there always exist equilibria where the
consensus properties are guaranteed, there also exist equilibria, where those properties are
violated, both in the case where the proposal is always valid, or by trembling effect can be
invalid. When all committee members are rewarded once a block is produced, in equilibrium,
the validity property is always guaranteed; while rewarding only those who vote for the
produced block leads to the existence of equilibrium where an invalid block can be produced.
Moreover, equilibria when all committee members are rewarded are more efficient in terms
of the number of messages. Thus, rewarding all members of the committee seems to be
an interesting reward scheme, and need more investigations, in particular in more general
settings.
In this work, we consider only the game representing the consensus agreement in committee-
based blockchains, from a liveness point of view. Interestingly, it helps clearly identifying
coordination problems that are likely to be present in more general settings.
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